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ANTS, ELEPHANT GUNS, AND STATUTORY
SUBJECT MATTER
Kristen Osengat
ABSTRACT: Questions about whether software qualifies for patent
protection are becoming increasingly more prevalent, despite the fact the
issue seemed settled. The Supreme Court has indicated its interest in the
topic and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office-which had previously
been liberally issuing patents in the computer-related arts-now appears to
be leading the groundswell against the subject-matter eligibility of these
inventions, rejecting an increasing number of applications in this area for
lack of statutory subject matter. Despite the broad definitions of patentable
subject matter provided by the Constitution, Patent Act, and Supreme
Court, the Patent Office has grafted various additional requirements onto
the statute, the most recent being the requirement that the invention be
within the "technological arts." In an effort to clarify the official Patent
Office position, the Board of Patent Appeals and Inteiferences recently
suppressed the notion of a separate "technological arts" inquiry. The
Patent Office shortly thereafter issued interim guidelines for examination of
patent applications for patentable subject matter, paying particular
attention to computer-related inventions.
The statutory subject matter issue is not as complex as the Patent
Office's activity suggests. Rather, in promulgating these guidelines, the
Patent Office is trying to kill an ant with an elephant gun, overcomplicating what should be an essentially simple question. This Article
shows that the Patent Office, the courts, and even some commentators, have
used subject-matter rejections as a way to avoid tackling policy or practical
issues that should be handled through other means; the rejections are
merely proxies for inquiries that should more appropriately be made under
other statutory patentability requirements. To prevent the Supreme Court
t
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from making the same mistake when it takes up the issue, the Patent Office
must be disarmed by removing any software-specific inquiry from the
determination of patentable subject matter.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite any negativity the dot.com bust may have cast over the software
industry, 1 it is clear that software today has been integrated into essentially
all areas of everyday life. 2 Software is accessed daily on personal computers
and over the Internet, at home and at the office, for both leisure and
business, and in industries from retail to manufacturing to education to food
service. At work, we use software to enhance our communication, optimize
our distribution systems, facilitate visual presentations and virtual training
simulations, and automate our payroll and accounting systems. At home, we
use software to help us manage our appointments, book our vacations,
monitor our children, shop in our pajamas, and, last but not least, provide
abundant opportunities to waste our free time. Even on the rare occasions
when we excise ourselves from our desktop, laptop, and handheld computer
systems, we are still constantly interacting with software. It is present, for
example, in the global positioning system in our cars, the self-checkout
kiosks at the grocery store, the battery-management algorithms in our cell
phones, and the setback feature in our home thermostats. Given the
seemingly infinite number of software applications in our daily lives, it
should not then be surprising that the software industry is one of the most
important economic sectors. 3
While the pervasiveness of software is indisputable, the question remains
whether and to what extent software-related inventions should be protected
by the patent system. For much of history, commentators, courts, and
people in the computer and software industries believed that software was
1.
At various points in this paper, I may appear to conflate software and Internet
applications. While all Internet applications are software, only some software programs are
Internet applications. With the ubiquity of the Internet, the conflation is not unfair; however,
this conflation should not be seen as an exclusion of non-Internet software applications, merely
as a shorthand notation for all software-related inventions. Yet another conflation is the
relationship between software-related inventions and business methods. Although these two
categories are wholly separate, in that you can have a software-related invention that does not
include a business method and you can have a business method that is not implemented via
software, the criticisms and concerns are similar and any decision affecting one is likely to
affect the other. Moreover, most business methods are at least contemplatively implemented via
software.
2.
Bradford L. Smith & Susan 0. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection
in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241,241 (2004).
3.
/d.
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not eligible for patenting. 4 One justification for this idea was that patent
protection would harm both the software industry and society as a whole. 5
Yet, despite the lack of patent protection in its early stages, the software
sector flourished. 6
Despite the high level of innovation in the absence of patent eligibility,
inventors and patent attorneys continued, and still persist, to push the
envelope of the patent system, maintaining that software inventions require
adequate legal protection. 7 Although early on the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("Patent Office") vigorously maintained that softwarerelated inventions were not eligible for patenting, a string of Supreme Court
cases in the 1970s and 1980s opened, or at least set ajar, the Patent Office
door to the software industry. 8 These cases were followed by a 1999 opinion
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal
Circuit") in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc., 9 suggesting the patent eligibility of business method inventions, which
essentially threw the Patent Office doors wide open for all software-related
inventions. 10
Following the State Street decision, patent applications for computer
software, Internet applications, and business methods flooded the Patent
4.
Throughout this Article, I will use the term "patent eligible" to refer to whether the
application describes statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101-the critical question is
whether the invention may be patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (Inventions Patentable). In
contrast, the term "patentable" refers to the other requirements under Title 35, such as utility,
novelty, and nonobviousness-the question here is whether a patent should be granted.
5.
Some seventeen years ago, Professor Pamela Samuelson argued against software
patents, noting that "[p]redictions that patents may be harmful to the software industry,
computer science, mathematics, or society as a whole have been quite frequent, even from some
of the most well-known people in the software and computer science fields." Pamela
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1133 (1990).
6.
In recent times, Bradford Smith and Susan Mann of Microsoft have credited patent
Jaw for at least a portion of the progress of software innovation. See Smith & Mann, supra note
2, at 241 ("Intellectual property (IP) laws have had an important impact on the software
industry's success.").
7.
See, e.g., Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the Intellectual Property
Concept, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1369, 1378 ("Software ... is as close to pure intellectual property as
any product can be. It needs some form of legal protection if society is to expect people to
devote their energies and capital to its production.") (footnote omitted).
8.
See discussion of Gottschalk v. Benson, Parker v. Flook, and Diamond v. Diehr, infra
Part II.A, for a more complete discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions that clarified the
patent eligibility of software.
9.
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
10. /d. at 1375-77; see discussion of State Street, infra notes 108-15. Oddly, the Patent
Office also played an important part in this new acceptance of software-related inventions, as
the State Street decision involves an issued patent, but the Federal Circuit's opinion confirmed
and expanded the idea.
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Office. Although for a few years the applications worked their way quietly
through the Patent Office, resulting in issued patents, the scene is quickly
changing-a number of these applications have now recently been rejected
for lack of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 11 This movement
towards limiting, or perhaps even eliminating, the patent-eligibility of
software-related inventions is not limited to the Patent Office. Recent
evidence suggests that the courts, including the Supreme Court, are poised
to reconsider the issue in the near future. For example, in the Supreme
Court oral argument held recently in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 12 a
case focused not on subject-matter eligibility but on the extraterritorial
application of U.S. patent law, multiple Justices asked questions relating to
the scope of intellectual property protection that ought to be afforded to
software. 13 Similarly, Justice Breyer, in his dissent from the Court's
dismissal of the Laboratory Corp. of American Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc. 14 case, questioned whether business methods and
software are eligible for patent protection. 15 And most recently, the Federal
Circuit laid a solid foundation for Supreme Court review of subject-matter
eligibility by issuing two opinions, In re Nuijten 16 and In re Comiskey, 17 that
address the issues head-on and seemingly change the § 101 landscape. It
seems merely a matter of time until the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a
case that squarely addresses statutory subject matter in the computer-related
arts. Until the Court does address the issue head-on, however, the Patent
11. One study asserts that, in 2005, applications assigned to the U.S. Patent Office
Technology Center 2100 (Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security)
experienced an increase in § 101 subject-matter rejections of more than 200% over similar
rejections in 2004. Steven M. Greenberg, The Inconsistent Treatment of Computer Software as
Patentable Subject Matter, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 77, 87 (2006). The reasons for these
rejections typically fell into one of two categories: failure to meet the technological arts test or
failure under the mental steps test. !d. at 88. A discussion of these tests follows, infra Part II.B
and Part IV.C.b.3.
12. 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
13. See, for example, Justice Stevens' question directed to Daryl Joseffer, Esq., Assistant
to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice: "I want to ask you one yes or no question. In
your view is software patentable?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056).
14. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
15. !d. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (raising§ 101 issues sua sponte at oral argument and requesting additional briefing on the
topic in a business method case).
16. 500 F.3d 1346, 1353-58 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (interpreting the four statutory categories of
35 U.S.C. § 101 and determining that signal claims do not fit within any of these four
categories).
17. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that certain
business method claims that can be performed entirely by a human being do not fit within the
enumerated categories of § I 0 I).
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Office seems content to lead the groundswell against software patent
eligibility.
The Patent Office's opposition to patent eligibility for computer-related
inventions is exemplified in Ex parte Lundgren, 18 a case from the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"), and the recently issued interim
guidelines for determining whether an invention comprises statutory subject
matter. 19 The reason given by the Patent Office for promulgating the
guidelines was the filing of "increasing numbers of applications . . . that
raise subject-matter eligibility issues." 20 Although the guidelines eviscerate
many of the subject-matter eligibility tests found inapplicable by the courts
and the BPAI, the Patent Office has grafted a physicality requirement onto
the examination of software-related inventions that is expressly directed at
software and business methods and is bound to lead to an increased number
of statutory subject-matter rejections. 21 In tum, the Federal Circuit has now
sanctioned this notion of physicality in the recent In re Comiskey opinion,
where it stated that "processes involving mathematical algorithms used in
computer technology"-essentially, software-may be patentable so long
as "they claimed practical applications and were tied to specific
machines :m
The promulgation of these guidelines by the Patent Office is equivalent
to trying to kill an ant with an elephant gun-overcomplicating what is
essentially a simple question. First, the question of subject-matter eligibility
for software-related inventions should be considered an ant, or maybe an
anthill, rather than the ever-growing mountain that many parties, including
the Patent Office, view it to be. Second, the Patent Office's interim
examination guidelines approach the problem of software patent
applications with a rather unnecessary elephant gun. The Patent Office and
some commentators are using § 101 rejections as a means to avoid tackling
other policy or practical issues that should be handled through other
18. B.P.A.I. No. 2003-2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Sept. 28, 2005); see also Ex parte
Bilski, B.P.A.I. No. 2002-2257, slip op. at 32, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, *39 (Sept. 26, 2006)
(rejecting a business method invention for lack of statutory subject matter).
19. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 2005), available at
http://www .uspto.gov/web/offices/pacldapp/opla/preognotice/guidelines I 0 1_20051 026.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 Guidelines].
20. /d. at I.
21. /d. at 2, 19, 42 (suggesting that subject-matter-eligible inventions either will transform
an article or physical object to another state or thing or will produce a useful, concrete, and
tangible result, both having an element of physicality associated). The 2005 Guidelines and the
physicality requirements implicated by the guidelines are discussed in greater detail in Part IV,
infra.
22. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1377 (emphasis added).
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avenues. The rejections thus serve as proxies for inquiries that are made
more appropriately under other requirements of patentability, such as utility,
novelty, nonobviousness, adequate written description, and enablement. 23
There is no reason to treat the inquiry into subject-matter eligibility of
software-related inventions any differently than applications directed
towards other types of inventions. Subjecting software patent applications
to the same standards of eligibility and patentability, without the extra
layers imposed by the guidelines, comports with both policy and precedent.
In Part II of this Article, I trace the history of subject-matter eligibility
for software-related inventions, including a discussion of the previously
mentioned Supreme Court and Federal Circuit opinions that paved the way
for patenting software. I also examine the BP AI decision in Ex parte
Lundgren and the details of the interim examination guidelines issued by
the Patent Office thereafter. In Part III, I explain why the question of
subject-matter eligibility of software applications is like an ant-a tiny and
inconsequential creature that should not concern us much. In Part IV, I
tackle the other side of the analogy and explain why the Patent Office's
guidelines are akin to approaching the question of eligible subject matter
with an elephant gun-a bit of overkill. Finally, in Part V, I propose that the
appropriate process for examining patent applications directed towards
software-related inventions is precisely the same as the process used for
other technological areas. In short, the question of subject-matter eligibility
for any invention is essentially pro forma, and whether a patent is granted
for a particular invention should be based on the application meeting the
requirements of patentability provided by 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.
II.

HISTORY OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY OF COMPUTER-RELATED
INVENTIONS

For much of history, software-related inventions were believed by the
Patent Office, the courts, and commentators to be ineligible subject matter
for patenting. 24 Subject-matter eligibility is derived from the Constitution
and the Patent Act, both of which take a very expansive view of eligible
subject matter. The Constitution authorizes patents on inventions that

23. These patentability requirements are specifically found at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility),
§ 102 (novelty), § 103 (nonobviousness), and § 112 (adequate written description and
enablement). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (2002).
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promote the "useful arts," 25 which has been interpreted in modem times to
mean the "technological arts." 26 The Patent Act is equally broad, permitting
a patent to be granted to anyone who "invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.'m At least
in theory, any invention that fits somewhere within these four categories
and is not one of three well-accepted exceptions-natural phenomena, laws
of nature, or abstract ideas-is eligible subject matter for patenting. 28
Despite the seeming clarity of the authorizing provisions in the
Constitution and the Patent Act, however, it would take the courts a few
decades to meander through a number of unfortunate opinions and reach
this simple conclusion. Although the courts and the Patent Office had, until
recently at least, reached the point where computer-related inventions were
considered eligible for patent protection, these early cases are important to
explain the genesis of many of the proxy-type inquiries that are being
unnecessarily and erroneously applied to these applications even today.
A. Judicial Interpretation of Patent Eligibility

The earliest case in which the Supreme Court considered the subjectmatter eligibility of software-related inventions was the 1972 case
Gottschalk v. Benson. 29 Benson involved a method for converting binarycoded decimal numbers to pure binary numbers. 30 The method was not
limited to any particular technology, apparatus, or end use. 31 The examiner
rejected the claims as nonstatutory subject matter under § 101 because the
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
26. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1375 (citing Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270,
1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en bane)) (equating "useful arts" with "technological innovation"); In re
Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the
Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1437. Whether "technological arts" should be
defined expansively or narrowly has been the subject of debate, but includes at least industrial
processes and physical artifacts. See Durham, supra at 1451.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
28. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542-43 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane) ("The plain and
unambiguous meaning of§ 101 is that any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter ... may be patented if it meets the requirements for patentability set forth
in Title 35 .... Despite the apparent sweep of§ 101, the Supreme Court has held that certain
categories of subject matter are not entitled to patent protection .... [T]here are three categories
of subject matter for which one may not obtain patent protection, namely 'laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."' (internal citations omitted)).
29. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
30. !d. at 64.
31. /d.
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claims described mental processes or mathematical steps, and the BPAI
affirmed. 32 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCP A") reversed
the Board, finding that the claims were directed to computer hardware,
negating the mental-processes rejection, and finding that any mathematical
algorithm would have practical use only as part of the computer
technology. 33 The Patent Office appealed the CCPA's decision to the
Supreme Court, which reversed, finding the subject matter of the claims
ineligible for patent protection. 34 In particular, the Court was influenced by
the fact that the claims "were not limited to any particular art or technology,
to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use." 35
Rather, the Court found the invention was an algorithm or abstract idea, an
exception to subject matter that would otherwise fit within the statutorily
defined eligible subject-matter categories. 36 The Court also expressed
concern that patenting an invention of this type "would wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself." 37 The Court's holding-that any invention that would
preempt the use of a mathematical algorithm does not comprise statutory
subject matter-is a fair interpretation of the law. However, this is not how
the Patent Office applied the holding of the Benson Court. Rather, the
Patent Office interpreted this case as holding that software inventions were
unpatentable subject matter per se. 38
The Supreme Court next took up eligible subject matter in Parker v.
Flook. 39 During the process of catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons, a set of
conditions, such as temperature, pressure, and flow rate, is constantly
monitored. 40 If any of these variables exceeds a preset alarm limit, it may
indicate an abnormal condition. 41 While fixed alarm limits are appropriate
for steady-state operation, transient operation may require the alarm limits
to be periodically updated. 42 Flook's invention was directed toward a
method for updating the variable alarm limits and improved upon the prior
art through the use of a particular algorithm for this recalculation of the

32. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682,684 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
33. !d. at 687-88.
34. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 63.
35. /d. at 64.
36. /d. at 67-68.
37. /d. at 72.
38. See, e.g., Robert Greene Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory
Subject Matter Under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L. REV. 217,221 (2004).
39. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
40. /d. at 585.
41. /d.
42. /d.
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limits. 43 The examiner rejected the claims as being directed to ineligible
subject matter because the resulting patent would be a patent on the
mathematical formula itself; the BPAI affirmed, adding that the only point
of novelty of the invention was the algorithm. 44 The CCPA reversed,
reasoning that the Benson holding only excluded mathematical formulas per
se and that the mere solution of the algorithm included in Flook's claims
would not infringe the claims themselves. 45 The Supreme Court again
reversed the CCPA and found the subject matter to be ineligible for
patenting. 46 The Court reasoned that because mathematical algorithms are
unpatentable and because the sole novel feature of Flook's invention was its
algorithm, the application failed to describe eligible subject matter. 47
Moreover, the Court stated that the fact that Flook's invention was more
than just the algorithm, that it involved post-solution steps, was insufficient
to distinguish this case from Benson. 48 At the time, this decision simply
reinforced the Patent Office's per se ban on patenting of software
inventions. Now, however, the Flook opinion is making an interesting
comeback as support for rejecting subject matter as ineligible under§ 101. 49
The last Supreme Court case to speak to subject-matter eligibility of
software-related inventions was Diamond v. Die hr. 50 The invention in Diehr
was directed towards a process for molding and curing rubber. 51 To achieve
accurately cured rubber, the molding press must be opened at a certain time,
calculated using the Arrhenius equation. 52 The invention provided a method
for repeatedly measuring the conditions of the curing rubber, applying the
Arrhenius equation to the measured data, and determining the time
remaining until the press should be opened. 53 The method was to be
performed by a computer, and when the ideal curing time had been reached,
the computer would signal the press to open automatically. 54
43. /d.
44. /d. at 587.
45. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
46. Parker, 437 U.S. at 596.
47. /d. at 593-94.
48. See id. at 590 ("The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or
obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to
almost any mathematical formula .... ").
49. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (adopting a Patent
Office argument based on Flook in finding ineligible subject matter for a business method that
was not tied to a specific machine).
50. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
51. !d. at 177.
52. /d. at 177-78.
53. /d.at178-79.
54. /d. at 179.

1096

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Although the invention in Diehr looks, at least superficially, similar to
Flook--data are measured, data are manipulated using a mathematical
algorithm or formula, and the output of the algorithm is used for some
industrial purpose-the outcome of the case was diametrically opposite.
The Supreme Court held the software-related invention in Diehr to be
patent-eligible subject matter, even though the invention included the
presence of a mathematical algorithm or equation. 55 The Court strained to
square this decision with Flook and Benson, stating that the inventions in
those cases were simply mathematical formulas, while Diehr was an
invention for curing rubber. 56 The question to determine whether an
invention comprises eligible subject matter, the Court noted, is not whether
the invention includes a mathematical algorithm or has software
components, but rather whether such a claim containing a mathematical
formula or algorithm "implements or applies that formula [or algorithm] in
a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a
function which the patent laws were designed to protect (for example,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing)." 57 This
transformation requirement, introduced by the Diehr case, is still present in
the subject-matter eligibility calculus. 58
Perhaps the story would have ended there, but the Patent Office
continued (and continues) to issue rejections based on lack of eligible
subject matter, and the Federal Circuit has continued this path of ruling, in a
rather haphazard fashion, on the same. In fact, the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence on the subject-matter eligibility of software-related inventions
is no less mind-boggling. Although any number of cases would provide the
same illustration, two in particular are exemplary: In re Grams 59 and
Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp. 60 Grams
involved "a method of testing a complex system to determine whether the
system condition is normal or abnormal and, if it is abnormal, to determine
the cause of the abnormality." 61 The method comprised the steps of
gathering data about the system and then analyzing the data to determine
the condition. 62 The examiner rejected and the BPAI affirmed that the
55. /d.at191-93.
56. See id. at 185-87. The Supreme Court also silently overruled Flook, noting that "(i]t is
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of
old elements in the analysis." !d. at 188.
57. /d. at 191-92.
58. See infra Part IV.C.1.
59. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
60. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
61. In re Grams, 888 F.2d at 836.
62. /d. at 837.
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claims were either mathematical algorithms or methods of doing business,
and as such, were ineligible subject matter for patenting. 63 The Federal
Circuit upheld the determination of ineligible subject matter because the
invention was merely a mathematical algorithm. 64 The lone physical step in
Grams's process was the initial gathering of data; the court held that "[t]he
presence of a physical step in the claim to derive data for the algorithm will
not render the claim statutory [subject matter]." 65
In contrast, the court reached a seemingly opposite result in Arrhythmia
Research. The invention in this case analyzed electrocardiograph ("ECG")
signals to determine characteristics of heart function. 66 In particular, the
claimed method involved converting an ECG signal, filtering the signal
subject to an algorithm, and comparing the resulting signal to certain
predetermined levels to determine if the patient was at a higher risk for a
certain cardiac condition. 67 The Patent Office issued the patent without
question. 68 However, in an infringement litigation trial, a district court
found the patent to be invalid for lack of eligible subject matter under
§ 101. 69 Despite the lack of any traditionally physical step, the Federal
Circuit held the claims were directed toward statutory subject matter and
reversed. 70 The court reasoned that the "claimed steps of 'converting',
'applying', 'determining', and 'comparing' are physical process steps that
transform one physical, electrical signal into another.'m Although the
Arrhythmia Research court attempted to distinguish Grams on the grounds
that the claims in Grams would preempt use of the algorithm in situations
beyond the contemplation of the inventor, 72 the Grams opinion makes it
clear that the court was influenced by the lack of physicality. 73 This
physicality requirement, that the court found lacking in Grams but present

63. /d. at 836.
64. /d. at 841. Because the court found the claims to be nonstatutory subject matter as a
mathematical algorithm, the court did not reach the Patent Office's alternative basis of
ineligibility due to being a business method. /d.
65. /d. at 840.
66. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
67. /d. at 1055.
68. /d.
69. /d. at 1054.
70. /d. at 1059, 1061.
71. /d. at 1059.
72. /d. ("The claims do not encompass subject matter transcending what [the inventor]
invented, as in ... Grams (invention had application to 'any complex system, whether it be
electrical, mechanical, chemical or biological, or combinations thereof')." (citation omitted)).
73. See discussion of In re Grams, supra notes 59, 61--65 and accompanying text.
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in Arrhythmia Research, remains in the present statutory subject-matter
inquiry. 74
The court's reliance on physical transformation continued in In re
Alappat. 75 The invention in Alappat was directed towards "a means for
creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope." 76
Specifically, Alappat invented an anti-aliasing system or algorithm that
illuminated the display pixels at varying intensities to reduce discontinuity
and jaggedness in the waveform. 77 Although Alappat did not claim the
algorithm directly, the claims included a "rasterizer" with means for
performing the various steps of the algorithm. 78 The examiner rejected these
claims under § 101 for failure to recite statutory subject matter. 79 A threemember panel of the BPAI reversed the examiner's rejection, finding the
claims directed towards a machine, one of the clearly enumerated categories
of statutory subject matter. 80 The BPAI then took the case under
reconsideration by an expanded eight-member panel, which affirmed the
examiner's § 101 rejection because each of the claims recited only
mathematical algorithms. 81 The Federal Circuit reversed the BPAI decision,
stating that, although many of the elements recited performed mathematical
calculations, "the claimed invention as a whole is directed to a combination
of interrelated elements which combine to form a machine .... This is not a
disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an
'abstract idea,' but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete,
and tangible result." 82 This requirement of a useful, concrete, and tangible
result also remains a critical factor in the present subject-matter eligibility
inquiry. 83
As a final parting shot, the Alappat court ended the opinion with the
following endorsement, dicta though it may be, of the patent eligibility of
software-related inventions:
Under the Board majority's reasoning, a programmed general
purpose computer could never be viewed as patentable subject
74. See infra Part III.
75. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane). Interestingly, this case was not taken en bane
to consider the very important issue of statutory subject matter, but rather to clarify questions
with respect to the court's jurisdiction over decisions of the BPAI. /d. at 1530.
76. /d. at 1537.
77. /d.
78. /d. at 1539.
79. /d.
80. !d.
81. /d. at 1539-40.
82. !d. at 1544.
83. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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matter under § 101. This reasoning is without basis in the law. The
Supreme Court has never held that a programmed computer may
never be entitled to patent protection. Indeed, the Benson court
specifically stated that its decision therein did not preclude "a
patent for any program servicing a computer." Consequently, a
computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable
subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter
meets all of the other requirements of Title 35. In any case, a
computer, like a rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics. 84

Shortly after the Alappat decision, in 1995, the Patent Office proposed
Examination Guidelines for Computer-Implemented Inventions in response
to "recent changes in the law that governs the patentability of computerimplemented inventions." 85 After a period for comments, the Patent Office
then issued its Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions
("1996 Guidelines") "to assist Office personnel in the examination of
applications drawn to computer-related inventions." 86 The basic steps
provided by the 1996 Guidelines instructed the examiner to 1) determine
what the applicant has invented and is seeking to patent; 87 2) conduct a
thorough search of the prior art; 88 3) determine whether the invention claims
patentable subject matter under § 101 ;89 4) evaluate the application for
§ 112 compliance; 90 5) determine whether the invention is new (§ 102) and
nonobvious (§ 103); 91 and 6) communicate the findings, conclusions, and
bases to the applicant. 92
The 1996 Guidelines then provided some instructions explicitly related
to examination of software-related inventions. For example, the 1996
Guidelines directed the examiner to no longer begin examination by
determining if the claim recites a mathematical algorithm, but to focus
84. In re Alappat, 33 F. 3d at 1545 (internal citation omitted).
85. Request for Comments on Proposed Examination Guidelines for ComputerImplemented Inventions, 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778, 28,778 (June 2, 1995); see also U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, Off. Gazette Notices, Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
2005),
Applications
for
Patent
Subject
Matter
Eligibility
(Nov.
22,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm ("In the mid-1990's, the [Patent Office]
sought to clarify the legal requirements for statutory subject matter with regard to computerrelated inventions.").
86. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479
(Feb. 28, 1996).
87. !d. at 7479-80.
88. !d. at 7480-81. The placement of this step as second, prior to the determination of
eligible subject matter, is puzzling. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
89. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481-86.
90. !d. at 7486--87.
91. !d. at 7487.
92. !d.
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instead on the invention as a whole. 93 Further, under the third step, the
examiner was to classify the invention into one of the four enumerated
categories of statutory subject matter under § 101 and then to determine if
the invention fit into one of the three nonstatutory exceptions. 94 In so
determining, the 1996 Guidelines looked to the In re Beauregarcf5 decision
in favoring software-related inventions when the software was claimed in
an article of manufacture format. 96 In Beauregard, the Patent Office
conceded that "computer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as
floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."97
The 1996 Guidelines also set forth a classification scheme based on
descriptive material. 98 Descriptive material is either functional or
nonfunctional; the former includes "data structures and computer programs
which impart functionality when encoded on a computer-readable medium,"
while the latter includes anything else. 99 Nonfunctional descriptive material,
such as mere data, was always considered nonstatutory because it does not
impart functionality. 10° Functional descriptive material, so long as it was
claimed as a computer-readable medium encoded with a computer program,
was generally considered to be statutory. 101
Although the 1996 Guidelines were criticized for failing to add clarity to
the topic, 102 the guidelines were also praised for minimizing the inquiry into
subject-matter eligibility. 103 For this reason, examiners were taking a more
liberal view of subject-matter eligibility for software-related inventions, so

93. /d. at 7479.
94. /d.
95. 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
96. Although the 1996 Guidelines do not specifically reference the Beauregard case, these
claims that recite an invention embodied in a computer-readable medium are "now commonly
referred to as 'Beauregard claims"' and are "readily allowed by the PTO as long as they satisfy
the [other requirements of patentability.]" Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ronald S. Laurie, Source
Code Versus Object Code: Patent Implications for the Open Source Community, 18 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 235, 235 (2002).
97. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584.
98. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481.
99. !d. (footnote omitted).
100. See id.
101. !d.
I 02. See Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical
Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REv. 31,
54 (1999); Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 255,283-84 (1997).
103. Kreiss, supra note 102, at 54 (citing Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise
of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1162 n.369 (1995)).
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long as they were claimed in the preferred format. 104 One area where the
1996 Guidelines did not offer any additional information for examiners was
in the area of business methods, 105 which can be considered a particular subset of software inventions. 106 Business methods challenge the traditional
notion that patent-eligible inventions must have some sort of physical
aspect because business methods often revolve purely around the handling
and processing of intangible data. 107 Fortunately, it was not long after the
issuance of the 1996 Guidelines that the Federal Circuit spoke definitively
on the matter of patent eligibility for business methods and gave us the
widespread interpretation of statutory subject matter that has been the rule
until quite recently.
The invention in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc. 108 was a data processing system for implementing a hub and
spoke investment structure, where mutual funds (spokes) pool their assets in
a portfolio (hub) which was then organized as a partnership, permitting
advantages associated with the economies of scale and the tax advantages of
partnership. 109 Although the examiner contemplated rejecting the claims for
lack of statutory subject matter under § 101, the examiner allowed the
application once the method claims were cancelled, leaving only system
claims. 110 After the patent issued, in a trial for patent infringement, the
district court held otherwise, finding the patent invalid for lack of eligible

104. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an "Article
of Manufacture:" Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALL 1. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
89, 126 (1998).
105. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7479
("Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating claims directed to methods of doing
business. Claims should not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead, such claims
should be treated like any other process claims, pursuant to these Guidelines when relevant.").
106. There is no generally accepted definition of a "business method." John R. Allison &
Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time:
The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 730 n.1 (2006). However, when
people refer to business method patents, they often refer to those methods embodied in
software, such methods being "the most important and controversial." /d. Business methods can
be considered a subset of software-related inventions. /d. That being said, there are business
method patents that are not embodied in software; the analysis for these, however, is not
markedly different than that of software-related business method inventions.
107. See, e.g., RichardS. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an
Information Age, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 357-60 (2002).
108. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
109. /d. at 1370.
110. See id. at 1371. Because of this, the bulk of the State Street opinion that relates to
business method claims is actually dicta. The AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.
opinion confirms head-on the patentability of business methods. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
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subject matter. 111 Specifically, the district court found that the claims were
not eligible for patenting because they fell within either the mathematical
algorithm exception or the business method exception. 112 With respect to the
mathematical algorithm argument, the Federal Circuit took its logic in
Arrhythmia Research and Alappat one step further and stated that the
transformation of data by a machine through a series of mathematical
calculations into a final result constitutes a practical application of the
algorithm, because it produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result." 113
As to the business method exception, the court dismissed this argument
rather quickly by denying the very existence of such a test: "We take this
opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception [for business methods] to
rest."ll4
The court also took the opportunity to reiterate the breadth of patenteligible subject matter. First, the court noted that "[t]he plain and
unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention falling within one of
the four stated categories of statutory subject matter may be patented,
provided it meets the other requirements for patentability set forth in Title
35." 115 Because Congress used the term "any," and the Supreme Court
acknowledged that § 101 was to extend to "anything under the sun that is
made by man," 116 the Federal Circuit stated that it is improper to read any
limitations into § 101 where Congress did not so intend. 117
The State Street opinion was followed by AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 118 confirming business method patent eligibility.
Until late 2007, these cases represented the last major statements by the
Federal Circuit on the subject-matter eligibility of software-related
inventions. The opinions hold that there should really never be a § 101
rejection of these applications so long as data transformation is present and
the invention produces the requisite useful, concrete, and tangible result. 119
And yet, the Patent Office is clearly not convinced, 120 and, apparently,
neither are the courts. 121 The BPAI decision in Ex parte Lundgren 122 and the
111. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
112. /d. at 1372.
113. /d. at 1373.
114. /d. at 1375.
115. /d. at 1372.
116. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980).
117. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
118. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
119. See generally id.
120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
121. In perhaps a foreshadowing of things yet to come, the Supreme Court has recently
raised some flags about the future of software patentability. See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2927 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)

39:1087]

ANTS AND ELEPHANT GUNS

1103

subsequently issued 2005 Guidelines provide a good explanation of the
current state of affairs.

B. Ex parte Lundgren and the Interim Examination Guidelines
Although it initially came as a surprise to many, 123 the opinion of the
BPAI in Ex parte Lundgren now represents one of the clearest stands by the
Patent Office against the subject-matter eligibility of software-related
inventions. Interestingly, it is the extensive and thorough, albeit misguided,
dissent in Lundgren that is truly representative of the current Patent Office
position. 124 Dr. Carl A. Lundgren submitted a patent application directed
towards a method of compensating a manager and having a stated purpose
of preventing collusion by "reducing incentives for industry collusion
between the primary firm and a set of comparison firms in said industry"
and by "reducing incentives for coordinated special interest industry
lobbying." 125 The examiner rejected all of the claims in Lundgren's
application for ineligible or nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. 126 The examiner found that the claimed process produced a useful,
concrete, and tangible result, as required by the Federal Circuit's State
Street decision; however, the examiner maintained that the invention was
ineligible subject matter because it was "outside the technological arts" ar1d
was not a practical application. 127 A panel of the BPAI initially reversed the
examiner's rejections. 128 The examiner sought reconsideration, and an
expanded panel of the BPAI reheard the case, leading to the instant
opinion. 129

(discussed infra note 152); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The Federal Circuit has also signaled a reining in of its previously
expansive reading of§ 101 as applied to software and business methods in In re Comiskey, 499
F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), as well as a general willingness to revisit statutory subject matter in
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
122. B.P.A.I. No. 2003-2088,76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Sept. 28, 2005).
123. See Harold C. Wegner, Recent Software Protection Trends 6, 7 (Nov. 9, 2005),
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31 Publications/FileUpload 137/2991 /doc.pdf.
124. See, e.g., Ex parte Bilski, B.P.A.I. No. 2002-2257, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51 (Sept.
26, 2006) (adopting the analysis of the Lundgren dissent and rejecting the invention for lack of
statutory subject matter).
125. Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1385 (quoting application of Lundgren,
08/093,516).
126. /d. at 1386.
127. /d.
128. /d.
129. /d.
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The BPAI reversed the examiner's rejection under § 101 in a very short,
concise, and sound opinion. 130 The Board found that the only issue in the
case was whether the claims were "limited to the technological arts, as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 101." 131 After reviewing the precedent alleged to
have given rise to the "technological arts" test, 132 the Lundgren majority
held that "[t]here is currently no judicially recognized separate
'technological arts' test to determine patent eligible subject matter under
§ 101." 133 Thus, because the Examiner had already determined that the
invention produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result, the invention was
eligible for patent protection.
The majority opinion in Lundgren is overshadowed by the extensive
partial dissent by Judge Barrett. 134 This dissent, although only of persuasive
precedential value, is the analysis that is clearly shaping the future of the
Patent Office's position on the patent eligibility of software-related
inventions. This influence is evidenced in the 2005 Guidelines, discussed
below, 135 and in subsequent decisions of the BPAI. 136 Although Judge
Barrett joined the majority in rejecting the "technological arts" test
employed by the examiner, 137 Judge Barrett disagreed with the majority's
assertion that any series of steps is a "process" under § 101 and that the
requirement that the invention produce a useful, concrete, and tangible
result is sufficient to determine eligibility. 138 After providing a very
thorough, thoughtful, and detailed analysis of the history of eligible subjectmatter jurisprudence (provided in abbreviated form above), Judge Barrett
130. See generally id. at 1385-88.
131. /d. at 1387.
132. Specifically, the examiner cited In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), In re
Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978), and Ex parte Bowman, B.P.A.I. No. 1999-0583, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d 1669 (June 12, 2001 ), as supporting the existence of such a test. Ex parte Lundgren,
76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1387.
133. Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1388. The Board held that, to whatever extent
Musgrave may have implied the existence of a "technological arts" requirement, Toma
specifically held that Musgrave "was not intended to form a basis for a new§ 101 rejection." /d.
at 1387 (quoting In re Toma, 575 F.2d at 878). With respect to Bowman, the Board quickly
dismissed the case as nonprecedential and nonbinding. /d.
134. See id. at 1389-1432; see also infra Part IV.C.3.c.
135. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Ex parte Bilski, B.P.A.I. No. 2002-2257, slip op. at 42-53, 2006 Pat. App.
LEXIS 51, *52-64 (Sept. 26, 2006) (adopting the Lundgren opinion in whole, but relying
primarily on the analysis in Judge Barrett's dissent).
137. Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1389. In fact, the majority opinion does not even
reject Judge Barrett's thoughts outright, stating instead that Judge Barrett's new ground of
rejection "would involve development of the factual record and, thus, [the Court] take[s] no
position in regard to the proposed new ground of rejection." /d. at 1388.
138. See id. at 1389-90.
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stated that precedent suggests three potential independent tests for statutory
subject matter. 139 These tests include 1) whether the invention includes a
physical transformation, 2) whether the invention falls within a set of
exceptions to statutory subject matter, for laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas, and 3) whether the invention produces a
useful, concrete, and tangible result. 140 The common theme underlying each
of these three tests is the notion of physicality or tangibility, a theme that
carries over into the 2005 Guidelines.
In applying each of these three tests-transformation, exceptions, and
useful, concrete and tangible result-to Dr. Lundgren's invention, Judge
Barrett would have affirmed the examiner's rejection of the claims under
§ 101 for lack of statutory subject matter. 141 Specifically, he found that Dr.
Lundgren's process performed no physical transformation and included no
physical implementation or structure, that the process was a disembodied
abstract idea, and that the process did not provide a concrete and tangible
result because it lacked physical instantiation. 142
In October 2005, the Patent Office issued Interim Guidelines for
Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility to
again provide guidance for examiners. 143 The guidelines were issued
ostensibly because the Patent Office had "seen increasing numbers of
applications ... that raise subject matter eligibility issues." 144 Not unlike the
1996 Guidelines for software examination described above, the 2005
Guidelines start innocently with a general process for examination that
could be applied to any application. The examiner is directed to determine
what the applicant invented, conduct a thorough search of the prior art,
determine whether the claimed invention complies with the subject-matter
eligibility requirement of § 101, evaluate the application for compliance
with the other requirements for patentability (i.e., §§ 102, 103, and 112),
and clearly communicate the findings, conclusions, and bases to the
applicant. 145 In relevant point, the 2005 Guidelines reject the "technological
arts" test, along with other tests that have been discredited. 146 Instead, the
139. See id. at 1429-32. Judge Barrett also acknowledges that precedent perhaps supports a
"technological arts" test, but for the reasons elucidated earlier in his opinion, he concludes that
this is not a separate test. !d. at 1430.
140. /d. at 1429-32.
141. See id. at 1431-32.
142. /d. at 1430-31.
143. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19. It is worthy of notice that the guidelines are not the
result of notice-and-comment rulemaking and thus do not have the effect of law. /d. at 2.
144. !d. at I.
145. /d. at 3-29.
146. /d. at 42-49.
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guidelines throughout subtly emphasize an element of physicality to find
patent eligibility. In particular, "[t]he guidelines explain that a practical
application of a 35 U.S.C. § 101 judicial exception is claimed if the claimed
invention physically transforms an article or physical object to a different
state or thing, or if the claimed invention otherwise produces a useful,
concrete, and tangible result." 147
The comment period on the 2005 Guidelines was extended through July
2006, in anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision in Laboratory Corp.
of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. ("LabCorp"), to be
issued by the end of the Court's October 2005 term. 148 Although not at issue
in the proceedings below, the Supreme Court's interest in LabCorp was
limited to clarifying patent-eligible subject matter. 149 The claim at issue
involved essentially two steps: assaying a body fluid and correlating the
results of the assay with a standard to diagnose mineral deficiency. 150 This
claim looks very similar to the software-related claims that the Supreme
Court reviewed in the 1970s, such as Parker v. Flook, where the claims at
issue boiled down to two steps: assess the condition of the system and
recalculate the alarm limits based on the condition. 151 Depending on how the
Supreme Court may have ruled in LabCorp, the entire software-related
patent world may have been turned upside down. In the end, the Supreme
Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted in June 2006, over
dissent. 152 Although the patent bar, especially those practicing in the
software-related arts, may have breathed a sigh of relief with the Supreme
Court's dismissal, the reprieve appears to be short lived. In September
147. /d. at 2 (emphasis added).
148. John Doll, Request for Comments on Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications
for
Patent
Subject
Matter
Eligibility,
July
11,
2006,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/corn/soVog/2006/week28/patgide.htm.
149. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2925 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. /d. at 2924.
151. /d.; see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,585 (1978).
152. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2921. The dissent would have found the patent involved to
be directed to a natural phenomenon and thus invalid due to lack of statutory subject matter. /d.
at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("There can be little doubt that the correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 'natural phenomenon."'). The
dissent also took aim at the invention as a process. /d. at 2928 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[The
patentee] cannot avoid the fact that the process is no more than an instruction to read some
numbers in light of medical knowledge."). Finally, the dissent took aim at the Federal Circuit's
business method jurisprudence, noting that the Supreme Court never made the statement that a
process is patentable so long as it produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result," and
pointing to Supreme Court cases such as Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, and Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), that arguably would be patentable under the Federal Circuit's lax
standard. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2927-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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2007, the Federal Circuit issued the In re Nuijten and In re Comiskey
opinions, each of which provide prime opportunity for the Supreme Court
to take up the issue of statutory subject matter. In any event, it is clear that
this area of law remains unsettled, and the Supreme Court seems poised to
enter into the discussion. 153
ill. WHY THE QUESTION OF SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY IS AN ANT (TINY
AND INCONSEQUENTIAL)

Satisfying the requirement of§ 101 is merely a threshold requirement to
obtaining a patent. 154 As such, this threshold should be a realistic hurdle, not
an insurmountable test. The language of § 101 is broad and inclusive; the
plain meaning of§ 101 is that if an invention falls into any one of the four
enumerated categories, the applicant "is allowed to pass through to the
second door," the remaining patentability requirements of§§ 102, 103, and
112. 155 Because nearly all inventions can be aptly categorized as a process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, the first door should not
present much of a challenge. Can it really be so easy? 156
Any analysis of law has to begin with the language and its purpose. With
respect to determining what subject matter is eligible for patenting, the
language comes from two sources-the Constitution and the Patent Act.
The Constitution authorizes the grant of a patent for an invention that
promotes the progress of the useful arts. 157 The language of the Patent Act is
equally broad, although in a different way. Each of the provisions that must
be satisfied prior to obtaining a patent, namely §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112,
serves a purpose in ensuring that the patent reward is granted to further the
153. The unsettled nature of this subject is bolstered by the urgings of the Patent Office to
the Federal Circuit to decide the In re Comiskey case on statutory subject matter grounds, an
issue that was raised sua sponte by the Federal Circuit at oral argument on another issue. In re
Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting the Patent Office's supplemental
briefing in response to the court's raising of the issue as urging resolution to "give the [Patent]
Office needed guidance in this area").
154. See id. at 1371 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (noting that § 101 is a threshold issue that must be
addressed before other questions of patentability); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A.
1979) ("The first door which must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101 ...
.").
155. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960.
156. To be fair, there are a number of thoughtful articles on this topic that do not find the
answer to come so easily. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 104; Kreiss, supra note 102; John R.
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1139 (1999). I acknowledge
the debate, but take the position that it can be this easy because the hard questions are more
appropriately addressed under other statutory patentability requirements.
157. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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constitutional mandate of promoting the useful arts as described above. 158 In
brief, the eligible subject-matter requirement of § 101 determines whether
the invention is related to the useful arts. 159 The utility requirement of§ 101,
and the novelty and nonobvious requirements of § 102 and § 103,
respectively, ensure the invention is a step forward or progress. 16° Finally,
description requirements of § 112 ensure that a person having ordinary skill
in the art can identify, understand, and practice the invention, ensuring that
progress is being promoted. 161
To ensure that the invention falls within the "useful arts," § 101 of the
Patent Act permits a patent to be granted to anyone who "invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter." 162 Statutory interpretation must begin with the
language of the statute, and words are given their ordinary and common
meanings, absent an alternative definition. 163 Further, "in dealing with the
patent laws, we have more than once cautioned that courts should not read
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed." 164 Giving the plain language of the statute its ordinary and
common meaning, it is clear that these four broad categories can arguably
be construed to cover nearly everything, which was Congress' intent. 165 As
the Supreme Court noted in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, "[i]n choosing such
expansive terms, . . . modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope." 166
The legislative history supports this breadth, noting that§ 101 encompasses
"anything under the sun that is made by man." 167
Putting aside all judicial precedent related to patent eligibility of
software-related inventions and viewing the question solely in light of the
Patent Act provisions, it is confusing that so many would take the position
that software is not patentable. Even limiting the notion of "useful arts" to
its historic definition of manufactures and industrial processes, it seems
158. See Chiappetta, supra note 104, at 100-02.
159. /d. at 102.
160. /d. at 100.
161. /d. at 100-01.
162. 35 u.s.c. § 101 (2000).
163. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37,42 (1979)).
164. /d. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
165. See id. at 183. There are anecdotes of professors who, when teaching subject matter
eligibility, tell students that if an attorney cannot make a persuasive argument that an invention
falls within one of the four statutory categories, the inventing client should seek a new,
competent attorney.
166. Chakrabany, 447 U.S. at 308.
167. S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 6--7 (1952).
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fairly clear that computer-related inventions are within the useful arts. 168
Business, manufacture, and service industries all consider software-related
inventions to be critical. Although the Framers may never have
contemplated the Internet, or even a computer, software-related inventions
would seem to be precisely the type of progress and business activity that
warrants the protection of the patent system. 169
The courts have recognized this shift and have struggled to adapt. The
Federal Circuit in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., noted:
Since the process of manipulation of numbers is a fundamental
part of computer technology, we have had to reexamine the rules
that govern the patentability of such technology. The sea-changes
in both law and technology stand as a testament to the ability of
law to adapt to new and innovative concepts, while remaining true
to basic principles .... [T]his court ... has struggled to make our
understanding of the scope of§ 101 responsive to the needs of the
modem world. 170
·

A software-related invention will nearly always be a process, because
computer programs are literally a set of instructions that directs a computer
to perform a certain function. 171 Thus, unless the invention, if patented,
would preempt a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea, and
so long as it has a practical application, it will always be statutory subject
matter. As a basic threshold issue, the Patent Office's raising of the bar for
patent eligibility of software-related inventions is really making a mountain
out of an anthill, or ant, as it were, and adding an inquiry to these inventions
that is not present for other technological areas. Given the Supreme Court's

168. International patent systems, however, have struggled with the same issue and found
software and business method inventions to be unpatentable, although there have been
initiatives to permit software patents in the European Patent system. See, e.g., Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United States'
Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. I, 9-10 (2004).
169. See Kreiss, supra note 102, at 64-66 (making a similar argument).
170. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[W]e must reconcile cutting-edge technologies with a statute, the language of which
dates back to the beginning of the Republic."). This notion also has the power to work in
reverse, that judicial decisions will influence law. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in
Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 825-26 (2005) ("[E]xperience shows the power of judicial
decisions to affect technologic advance and commercial vigor, particularly as new technologies
have arisen.").
171. Compare In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1354-55 (defining a process under 35 U.S.C. §
101 as an act or series of acts that produce a given result), with In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (seemingly drawing a distinction between a method-a set of steps for
doing something-and a process).
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renewed interest in this seemingly settled topic, it appears clear that it too is
likely to overcomplicate the inquiry.
IV. WHY THE INTERIM GUIDELINES ARE LIKE AN ELEPHANT GUN
(OVERKILL, ANYONE?)

Because the Patent Office unnecessarily views the question of subjectmatter eligibility as more complex than simply whether the invention falls
within one of the four enumerated categories, it is unsurprising that the
2005 Guidelines, promulgated by the Patent Office to deal with the
increasing number of applications that invoke statutory subject-matter
questions, also obfuscate the true inquiry. There are essentially two
inquiries that must be made to determine if an invention comprises eligible
subject matter for patenting: first, does the invention fit within at least one
of the statutorily defined categories of§ 101, and second, does the invention
fall within one of the three exceptions, namely law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea. The guidelines, however, add multiple and
unnecessary layers and raise the basic threshold inherent in this simple
approach-that is, the Patent Office is aiming at the simple issue of eligible
subject matter with an unwieldy elephant gun.
The Patent Office's approach to this problem is overkill for two reasons.
First, there is clearly some hostility toward the protection of softwarerelated inventions at the Patent Office and beyond. Despite the wide berth
generally given to patent-eligible subject matter in every other technological
arena, the examining corps of the Patent Office continues to find new, and
at times ingenious, ways to reject this type of application. 172 And there is
clearly some foothold of support for this notion at higher levels of the
Patent Office, up to and including the BPAI. 173 While the 2005 Guidelines
superficially disabuse the perception of software-related inventions as
ineligible subject matter, the reality is that the guidelines actually provide
more bases for § 101 rejections going forward. This sleight of hand makes it
appear that the Patent Office is accepting the Lundgren majority, but the
reality is that it is the dissent that has become policy.
Second, and more troubling, many applications suffer§ 101 rejections as
a proxy for other, more difficult rejections and policy considerations.
172. Consider, for example, the examiner in Ex Parte Lundgren, B.P.A.I. No. 2003-2088,
76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Sept. 28, 2005) (applying the technological arts requirement), discussed
supra Part II.B.
173. See, e.g., Ex Parte Bilski, B.P.A.I. No. 2002-2257, slip op. at 42-65,2006 Pat. App.
LEXIS 51, *52-80 (Sept. 26, 2006) (adopting the Lundgren dissent's more stringent
requirements for patent eligibility for software-related inventions).
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Because § 101 presents a threshold issue to be determined early in the
examination process, by availing itself of this provision the Patent Office
can avoid the often-problematic examination of software-related inventions.
This impression is supported by the courts' own opinions explaining § 101
rejections. Even the courts often resort to the difficulty of examining these
applications for the remaining patentability requirements as justification for
these rejections. A similar argument can be made for policy considerations:
the justification for § 101 's widespread use in rejections is often that
software patents are "bad" for society, not that the applications do not fit
within the statutorily defined categories. After providing a comprehensive
review of the 2005 Guidelines, I discuss the hostility and proxy arguments
in greater detail.
A. 2005 Guidelines

As discussed above, the general provisions of the 2005 Guidelines are
reasonable enough. First, the examiner must determine what the applicant
invented. 174 The guidelines instruct the examiner to ascertain this by: 1)
identifying and understanding any utility or practical application asserted
for the invention, 2) carefully reading the written description, and 3)
reviewing the claims. 175 The examiner then conducts a thorough search of
the prior art and determines whether the claimed invention complies with
the subject-matter eligibility requirement of § 101. 176 For determining
whether the invention complies with § 101, the guidelines provide four
steps. First, the examiner must consider the breadth of 35 U.S.C. § 101
under controlling law. 177 Second, the examiner must determine whether the
174. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 3.
175. /d. at 3-10. The first step, identifying utility and practical application, is actually an
imposition of the § 101 utility requirement, see, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2005), which arguably renders the § 101 subject matter eligibility question no longer a
threshold. For the purposes of this article and because it is so noted by court opinions, see, e.g.,
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), I will continue to view subject matter
eligibility as the threshold issue for patenting.
176. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at I 0-11. As a side note, it is unclear to me (and the
2005 Guidelines do not explain) why the examiner would need to conduct a thorough search of
the prior art before determining subject matter eligibility under§ 101. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at
962-63 ("Prior art is irrelevant to the determination of statutory subject matter under § 101.")
(emphasis omitted); cf SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (noting that even the scope of the claims is irrelevant to the subject matter eligibility
analysis, because "[e]ither the subject matter falls within Section 101 or it does not") (quoting
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920,930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
177. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 11-14 ("In choosing such expansive terms as
'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress
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claimed invention falls within the listed statutory categories (process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). 178 Third, the examiner
must determine whether the claimed invention falls within a judicially
created exception to the § 101 enumerated categories; that is, whether the
invention is a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea. 179
However, "[ w ]hile abstract ideas,. natural phenomena, and laws of nature
are not eligible for patenting, methods and products employing abstract
ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature to perform a real-world
function may well be." 18° Fourth, if the requirements for subject-matter
eligibility are not met, the examiner must establish a prima facie case on the
record. 181 Otherwise, after the examiner is satisfied with an invention's
subject-matter eligibility, he proceeds to evaluate the application's
sufficiency under§§ 102, 103, and 112. 182
To assist the examiner in determining whether the claimed invention is a
law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea, the Patent Office directs
the examiner to determine if the claim is directed to a practical application
of a judicial exception. 183 A practical application can be identified if "the
claimed invention physically transforms an article or physical object to a
different state or thing, or if the claimed invention otherwise produces a
useful, concrete, and tangible result," based on certain factors. 184 These tests
are clearly artifacts remaining from the courts' journey to arrive at the
patent eligibility of software-related inventions, as laid out by the discussion
above and as seen in Judge Barrett's disquisition in Lundgren. 185
In applying these tests, the 2005 Guidelines state that the examiner
should first determine if the claim "provides a transformation or reduction
of an article to a different state or thing." 186 If such a transformation is
present, the inquiry is complete and the claim meets the requirements of
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope." (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,308-09 (1980))).
178. !d. at 14-16. This inquiry is nearly pro forma. "In many instances, it is clear within
which of the enumerated categories a claimed invention falls. Even if the characterization of the
claimed invention is not clear, this is usually not an issue that will preclude making an accurate
and correct assessment with respect to the section 101 analysis." /d. at 15.
179. !d. at 16-18.
180. /d. at 17. This may be a difficult determination; a large portion of the remainder of the
2005 Guidelines is directed to making this assessment.
181. /d. at 24.
182. /d. at 25-28.
183. See id. at 1-2.
184. /d. at 2 (emphasis added).
185. Ex Parte Lundgren, B.P.A.I. No. 2003-2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1389 (Sept. 28,
2005) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
186. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 19.
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§ 101. 187 If not, the examiner must proceed to the second question: does the
claim "provide[] a practical application that produces a useful, tangible and
concrete result." 188 The guidelines then go on to define each of these terms.
In particular, an invention will be found to be "useful" if it satisfies the
utility requirement of § 101. 189 This will require that the utility of the
invention be specific, substantial, and credible. 190 The invention is
"tangible" if it produces a real-world result. 191 Finally, the invention will
produce a "concrete" result if the process is repeatable or predictable, or
produces substantially the same result again. 192
The examiner must also ensure that the invention, were it to be patented,
would not preempt the use of a law of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract idea. "One may not patent a process that comprises every
'substantial practical application' of an abstract idea, because such a patent
'in practical effect would be a patent on the [abstract idea] itself."' 193 "If an
examiner determines that the claimed invention preempts a § 101 judicial
exception, the examiner must identify the abstraction, law of nature, or
natural phenomenon and explain why the claim covers every substantial
practical application thereof." 194 Otherwise, if the invention would not
preempt a judicial exception, § 101 is satisfied, and the examiner can
proceed to examine the application for the other patentability standards. 195
The guidelines conclude with a set of annexes. 196

187. /d.
188. /d. at 19-20 (emphasis omitted). The guidelines make clear that it is not the steps that
need to be useful, tangible, and concrete but rather the result. /d. at 20-22.
189. /d.
190. /d.
191. /d. at 21-22.
192. /d. at 22. The guidelines also state that a rejection for failure to produce a concrete
result should also result in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of enablement because the
invention cannot operate as intended without undue experimentation. /d.; see 35 U.S.C. §
112( I) (2000).
193. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 23 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,7172 (1972)).

194. /d.
195. /d. at 24-28.
196. /d. at 30-59. Annex I provides a flowchart that visually depicts the previously
described examination procedure. /d. at 30-31. Annex II reviews case law relevant to the
determination of eligible and ineligible subject matter. Id. at 32-41. Annex III lists previously
applied tests for subject-matter eligibility of software that have since been renounced by the
courts and the Patent Office, including the technological arts test, the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test, the mental steps test, the machine-implemented test, and the per se data transformation test.
/d. at 42-49. Annex IV discusses computer-related nonstatutory subject matter, imparting the
"functional descriptive material" or "nonfunctional descriptive material" categories. /d. at 5057. Finally, Annex V adds specific information about mathematical algorithms./d. at 58-59.
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The 2005 Guidelines may seem comprehensive; however, they actually
represent a bit of heavy-handedness on the part of the Patent Office.
Specifically, the guidelines single out software-related inventions for
special treatment where none is required and, in doing so, add a number of
unnecessary steps to the § 101 determination--each step increasing the
chance that the Patent Office will find grounds to reject the application at an
early, threshold stage of examination. This overkill may be attributed to two
related reasons: hostility towards software-related inventions and the use of
the § 101 subject-matter inquiries as a simple proxy for other questions
more appropriately answered elsewhere.
B. Hostility to Software-Related Inventions

One explanation for the overkill nature of the 2005 Guidelines is that the
Patent Office is hostile toward software-related inventions. Without
question, and clearly evidenced by the case-law story told above, 197 the
Patent Office has historically been opposed to software-related
applications. 198 Despite the popular belief that this hostility toward software
was abating, the Ex parte Lundgren opinion, the cases that follow, and the
2005 Guidelines show that the resistance is still present. Moreover, it seems
that this opposition is also supported by at least some Justices on the
Supreme Court, as well as some judges on the Federal Circuit.
There is no consensus regarding the origin of the Patent Office's
opposition to the protection of software-reiated inventions. The Patent
Office could be displaying a remnant of the same hostility that the courts
held for many years. 199 However, it may also be argued that the Patent
Office is merely following this hostile line of cases in its guidelines and is
unable of itself to make any changes over the existing precedent. Even with
the most generous of interpretations, however, the Patent Office has made
its own poor choices in implementing the case law.
197. See supra Part II.
198. See Jeffrey R. Kuester, Scott A. Horstemeyer, & Daniel J. Santos, A New Frontier in
Patents: Patent Claims to Propagated Signals, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 75, 76
("At the time the Board heard the appeal [in In re Beauregard], the [Patent Office] was hostile
in allowing any type of patent protection for software, despite clear legal precedent to the
contrary ... .");Symposium on Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 254, 270 (2002) ("One of the core issues in both [biotechnology and software] is the
hostility toward intellectual property.... We have ... had advocates arguing against business
method and software patents.").
199. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection
of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351,407 (1993) ("In the early 1980's the [Supreme]
Court's bias against patents in general, which had persisted over the prior half century, began to
erode.").
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Alternatively, the opposition may be in response to the systemic
criticisms about the Patent Office's inability to adequately examine patent
applications and the resulting lack of quality in issued patents. 200 Software
patents in particular seem to be the target of much of these complaints. 201
Common objections include that granted software patents are overly broad,
that the claims for software-related inventions are often poorly drafted and
ambiguous, and that the inventions at issue are obvious. 202 While these
problems plague the Patent Office universally, the concerns may be
exacerbated by the lack of sufficient prior art in the software-related arts.
Rather than working to ensure that higher-quality software patents are
issued, the Patent Office might be hoping to avoid the problem altogether
by simply rejecting these applications at the threshold level of subjectmatter eligibility. "These pragmatic institutional concerns have been one
motivation for the [Patent Office's] long standing position that computer
software was not patentable subject matter." 203 Perhaps in attempting to
avoid criticism for issuing unwarranted patents, the Patent Office may have
run headlong into a separate problem, where subject-matter rejections are
being proffered not only to avoid issuing bad patents in the main, but also
specifically to serve as proxies for other patentability requirements or
policy-based inquiries.
C. Subject-Matter Rejections as Proxies

Rather than reacting directly to the criticism of its performance in
granting software patents, the Patent Office may be using § 101 rejections
as proxies for other difficult questions of patentability and policy. In fact,
200. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
606 (1999) ("A recurring theme in the assessment of PTO performance is poor examination
quality .... ");James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 47 (noting
that "the patent office has neither the time nor the expertise ... to distinguish good patents from
bad").
201. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1495 (2001) ("The [Patent Office] has come under attack of late for failing to do a serious
job of examining patents, thus allowing bad patents to slip through the system. The criticism is
particularly strong in specific industries, notably software and Internet 'business method'
patents, in which the [Patent Office] has arguably failed to respond quickly enough to changing
legal circumstances." (footnotes omitted)).
202. See Wegner, supra note 123, at 10 (citing IBM patent leader David J. Kappos as
noting, inter alia, that "[t]he Federal Circuit has essentially excused software inventions from
compliance with the enablement and best mode requirements, but in a manner that raises serious
questions about how stringently it will read the nonobviousness requirements").
203. Chiappetta, supra note 104, at 101.
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the problem may go deeper. If we accept the argument that many of these
proxy-type rejections are anchored in case law precedent, then perhaps the
courts too are using these rejections to avoid the hard analyses required by
the other statutory provisions. To be sure, it is tempting to try to improve
the ease of administration and enforcement of Patent Office activity,
especially in view of the complaints raised by the legal community and the
public at large about improvidently granted software-related patents.
Because it has been argued that there is a dearth of prior art in the software
field, the rejection of patent applications under § 101 is particularly
attractive. This type of rejection is not based on prior art, and, because
patentable subject matter is a threshold issue, it allows the application to be
disposed of at an early stage. 204 However, "the primary objectives of the
patent laws are not achieved merely by ensuring ease and speed of
prosecution, predictability of results or maximizing enforcement options." 205
Rather, the goal of the subject-matter inquiry should be "to determine which
inventive activities, if any, should be targeted by the patent incentive." 206
Although the proxy-type inquiries may be related to statutory subject
matter, they raise separate issues and should be determined separately.
As one such example of a proxy-type inquiry, the analysis of novelty
(§ 102) and nonobviousness (§ 103) has become entangled with the eligible
subject-matter analysis under § 101, leading to a confusion of both
discussions.Z07 One example of this confusion is the Supreme Court's
opinion in Parker v. Flook. As the dissent, which recognizes the conflation
in the majority opinion, characterized the case:
The issue here is whether the claimed process loses its status of
subject-matter patentability simply because one step in the process
would not be patentable subject matter if considered in isolation ..
. . I suppose that thousands of processes and combinations have
been patented that contained one or more steps or elements that
themselves would have been unpatentable subject matter.... [I]t
strikes what seems to me [a] damaging blow at basic principles of
patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the
criteria of novelty and inventiveness. 208

204. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1373 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The§ 101 issue is an
antecedent question to the [other requirements for patentability].").
205. Chiappetta, supra note 104, at 127.
206. /d. at 128.
207. See, e.g., Sam S. Han, Analyzing the Patentability of "Intangible" Yet "Physical"
Subject Matter, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2002).
208. Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The problem is that the points of each of these tests are different. While the
statutory subject-matter test ensures that we are inducing inventive activity
to promote the "useful arts," the novelty and nonobvious questions seek to
ensure that what is promoted is progress. 209
Although Parker v. Flook may be an early opinion, this entanglement of
the statutory subject-matter inquiry with the other patentability
requirements remains just as current today. For example, the In re Comiskey
opinion links eligible subject matter with the requirement that there be a
specified machine for performing the process, an inquiry that would more
appropriately be made under the written description requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112. 210 Similarly, In re Nuijten raises a number of proxy-type
arguments. In addressing a tangential issue, the court states that the focus of
the statutory subject-matter inquiry should not be on which of the four
categories (process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) to
which a claim is directed, but rather on the claimed invention's practical
utility, a separate issue. 211 In the dissenting opinion in Nuijten, the statutory
subject-matter inquiry is, at turns, ensnared with § 101 utility and § 102
novelty. 212 The use of statutory subject matter as a proxy for other inquiries
is clearly a persistent problem that is not abating.
Other commentators have also noted this proxy-type use of subjectmatter eligibility when a more appropriate inquiry would be found in
another provision for patentability. John Squires and Thomas Biemer note
that the Patent Office's approach of using§ 101 to ensure quality patents is
the improper focus: "[O]nce the focus is properly placed on the quality of
the patents it issues in [the financial service industry], it becomes clear that
different tools, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, readily exist for the [Patent
Office] to ensure such quality." 213
209. /d. at 595.
210. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This proxy argument is
explored in more detail under the "mental steps" rejection analysis, infra Part IV.C.3.b.
211. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For further detail, see
infra Part N.C. I and accompanying text discussing the distinction between practical utility and
subject-matter eligibility.
212. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1363 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[T]he terms 'new' and 'useful' define and delimit the exceptions from statutory subject
matter."). Despite the use of proxy-type arguments in his own analysis, Judge Linn is at least
conscious of the entanglements. See id. at 1363, 1366 (noting that novelty is generally a
requirement of§ 102, not§ 101, and further admonishing the Patent Office for blurring the line
between§ 101 eligible subject matter and§ 103 obviousness).
213. John A. Squires & Thomas S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren
Panel Decision Mean that the USPTO Is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject Matter Question
Right?, 461NTELL. PROP. L. REV. 561, 581-82 (2006). Although Squires and Biemer are largely
concerned with the financial services industry, the truth of their statement relates to softwarerelated inventions in any sector.
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The desire to alleviate other examination and invalidity problems by
resorting to § 101 is not unique to the Patent Office. 214 For example, in the
biopharmaceutical case SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., the
concurring opinion raised § 101 concerns, arguing that the composition of
matter at issue could be "reproduced by nature unaided by man." 215 The
majority, on the other hand, accused the concurrence of "confus[ing] patent
eligibility under § 101 with patentability under other provisions in the
Patent Act, such as 35 U.S.C. § 102."216 Instead, the majority states that the
claimed invention is a composition of matter or article of manufacture,
squarely within§ 101, and the inquiry should so end there. 217
This proxy-type rejection can also be seen both in tests that have been
excised from the subject-matter calculus by the 2005 Guidelines (such as
the mental steps test or the machine implementation test), as well as those
which remain (such as the transformation requirement), and even in the
analysis proposed and implemented by Judge Barrett in Lundgren or by
commentators and scholars. I will demonstrate that each of these inquiries is
better addressed under one or more alternative requirements for
patentability.
1.

Transformation

To determine whether a claimed invention is a practical application of
one of the excepted categories-i.e., an abstract idea, law of nature, or
natural phenomenon-the examiner is encouraged to analyze whether "[t]he
claimed invention 'transforms' an article or physical object to a different
state or thing." 218 In seeking to answer this question, the real inquiry is
whether the claimed application is useful-a question better addressed
under the § 101 utility doctrine. This crossover of ideas is clear even from
the 2005 Guidelines themselves: "[Transformation is] one example of how
a mathematical algorithm ... may bring about a useful application. " 219 This
conflation may be a holdover from some unfortunate language used in State
Street. 220 However, it is equally clear that utility and subject-matter
214. Nor is it limited to software-related inventions, although its occurrence is particularly
rampant for that type of invention.
215. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1364 (2005) (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring).
216./d.atl342.
217. /d.
218. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 19.
219. /d. at 20 (emphasis added).
220. See Rick Nydegger, B2B, B2C and Other "Business Methods": To Be or Not to Be
Patent Eligible?, 9 U. BALT.INTELL. PROP. L.J. 199, 209 (2001) ("The unfortunate aspect of the
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eligibility are two distinct inquiries: "An invention can be statutory subject
matter and be ... devoid of any utility." 221 As Professor Robert Kreiss
explains, something can be "useful but not subject matter (gravity), ...
subject matter but not useful (purified chemical compositions from plants
and animals with no known uses), [or neither of the above] (e-c2 and
naturally occurring chemical compositions with no known uses)." 222 To
hinge subject-matter utility on whether there is a useful application of a
mathematical algorithm, law of nature, or natural phenomenon incorrectly
merges two separate patent law doctrines. Although the argument of proxy
inquiry is interesting in an academic way, this conflation (and others
discussed below) also raises pragmatic concerns, as subject-matter
eligibility and utility are subject to review by the Federal Circuit under
different standards. 223
2.

Useful, Tangible, and Concrete Result

The alternative test to transformation-i.e., that the invention produces a
useful, tangible, and concrete result-suffers from the same and additional
flaws. For one, the 2005 Guidelines specifically tie the "useful result" prong
to utility under§ 101, 224 which, as noted above, should be a wholly separate
test. This raises two separate concerns. First, is the transformation test now,
or should it be, wholly subsumed in the useful, tangible, and concrete result
[State Street] opinion is the troubling ambiguity introduced by the court's reference to 'practical
utility' ... which leads one to wonder what the differences are between those various terms, if
any, as well as whether 'practical utility' for purposes of determining eligibility of subject
matter is the same as 'practical utility' for purposes of determining 'utility' in the classic sense
as a separate requirement of patentability.").
221. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962-63 (C.C.P.A. 1979); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188-91 (1981) (noting that the inquiry of whether a patent claims statutory subject
matter is separate from the other requirements of patentability, including utility); I PETER D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FuNDAMENTALS § 6.00, at 6-2 (2d ed. 1989) ("Statutory subject
matter is a substantive criterion of patentability separate and distinct from novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness."); Kreiss, supra note 102, at 74-75 (arguing that both the courts and the Patent
Office have erroneously confused and conflated the statutory subject matter and the requirement
of eligibility).
222. Kreiss, supra note 102, at 75.
223. See Kevin Casey et a!., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit:
Substance and Semantics, II FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 361 (2002) ("Statutory subject matter under
[§ 101] is a question of law reviewed de novo." (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc.,
172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). But, "[u]tility [under] § 101 is a question of fact
reviewed for clear error or substantial evidence." /d. (citing In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ).
224. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 20 ("For an invention to be 'useful' it must satisfy
the utility requirement of section 101.").
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inquiry? Second, for either, is the question of subject-matter eligibility
being used as a proxy for analyzing the utility of the claimed invention?
The requirement of concreteness similarly brings in notions that are more
appropriately addressed with respect to the § 101 utility requirement. In
order to be "concrete," the 2005 Guidelines indicate that "the process must
have a result that can be substantially repeatable or the process must
substantially produce the same result again." 225 In fact, the guidelines cite In
re Swartz226 for this proposition-a case which is clearly directed to the
utility (not the eligible subject matter) aspect of§ 101. 227 Moreover, Swartz
notes that the question of utility under § 101 also implicates issues of
enablement under § 112. 228 To satisfy enablement under § 112, the
application must disclose the claimed invention sufficiently to allow a
person having ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention without
undue experimentation-the very essence of repeatability or
predictability. 229 The 2005 Guidelines, in requiring eligible subject matter to
be repeatable or predictable, are similarly also intermingling elements of
§ 112 with the statutory subject-matter inquiry under§ 101.
3.

Other Tests

In addition to the currently favored § 101 tests discussed above, the tests
that have been rejected by the courts and the Patent Office, as well as those
that Judge Barrett offers up in Lundgren and those suggested by
commentators, are just as problematic with respect to serving as proxies for
other difficult determinations.

a.

Machine Implementation

The now-disfavored machine implementation test questioned whether
the claim recited a process implemented by a machine. 230 The test was
rejected because, based on Gottschalk v. Benson, a machine-implemented
process that is wholly directed to an abstract idea is not eligible subject
matter. 231 However, the real question behind this test is how the process
225. /d. at 22.
226. 232 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
227. /d. at 863-64 (denying Mr. Swartz's application for a cold fusion invention, noting
that the invention was inoperable and irreproducible).
228. /d.
229. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
230. 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 48-49.
231. !d. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,
292-93 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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happens; the proper inquiry is then under § 112-did the applicant fully
describe and enable his invention? It follows that, if the applicant does not
describe how the process is to be implemented, via machine or otherwise,
the applicant has failed to satisfy the enablement or written-description
requirements. If the process is not implemented by machine (or we are
otherwise unable to determine how to replicate the process on our own),
then the invention should be rejected under § 112, rather than the proxy
§ 101.
b.

Mental Steps

Similarly, the courts and the Patent Office have rejected the mental steps
test because the presence of a step that may be performed by a human is not
fatal to patentability. 232 However, this test may be experiencing a revival, as
evidenced by the Federal Circuit's opinion in In re Comiskey, where the
court stated that "mental processes-or processes of human thinkingstanding alone are not patentable even if they have practical application." 233
This test is most likely a proxy for the enablement requirement of§ 112. A
process that includes many mental steps will be much more difficult to
adequately describe at the level required to enable a person having ordinary
skill in the art, leading to a rejection under § 112. It is likely more difficult
to describe how to perform a step that takes place mentally, leading to
issues of lack of enablement. In fact, the Federal Circuit essentially
admitted as much in acknowledging the subject-matter eligibility of the
claims directed to the very same steps, but tied to specific machinery (that
is, those requiring a computer), and rejecting subject-matter eligibility to
those claims that were not tied to a specific machine (or did not explicitly
require a computer). 234 However, this is a separate inquiry from subjectmatter eligibility and should not be inserted into the application
examination at this point.
c.

Proposals from Judge Barrett

Judge Barrett, after reviewing the case law in detail, suggests that there
are three possible tests for statutory subject matter of software-related

232. See 2005 Guidelines, supra note 19, at 47 (citing Alco Standard Corp. v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
233. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
234. See id. at 1379 ("When an unpatentable mental process is combined with a machine,
the combination may produce patentable subject matter.").
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inventions where a machine does not implement the process. 235 These tests
are the transformation test, the judicial-exception test, and the "useful,
concrete and tangible result" test. 236 The analysis of the proxy-type status of
the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test is discussed above. The
judicial-exception test is not a proxy-type inquiry per se but may implicate
the same confusion between the two prongs of the § 101 analysis, as noted
above. Judge Barrett's proposals for the "transformation" test, as well as the
element of physicality that runs through his analysis, however, do raise
additional proxy-type inquiry concerns.
Interestingly, when Judge Barrett applies the "transformation" test, the
test becomes a proxy, not for § 101 utility as analyzed above, but for § 112
enablement. In his application of the test, Judge Barrett notes that the claim
"does not recite how the steps are implemented" and that the steps "are
broad enough to be performed without a machine." 237 These concerns sound
more like issues to be raised under § 112 enablement, similar to the
discussion provided for the now-excised machine implementation test. 238
Section 101 is not the proper inquiry for whether the applicant describes
how or with what to perform the steps.
Throughout all of his analyses, Judge Barrett focuses on physicality as a
prerequisite to subject-matter eligibility. For example, he states that certain
steps of the claimed process "[do] not recite any physical implementation"
or "since no machine is claimed, are disembodied." 239 Overall, the claimed
invention does not apply "natural science or engineering knowledge to
physical structure or to physical acts which transform physical subject
matter ... to a different state." 24° Finally, a concrete and tangible result
"requires some sort of physical instantiation." 241 This focus on physicality,
which is present to some extent in the 2005 Guidelines, can also be a proxytype inquiry for a concern more appropriately addressed under§ 112, where
a structural component or other description of implementation becomes
essential.

235. Ex parte Lundgren, B.P.A.I. No. 2003-2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1429-30 (Sept. 28,
2005) (Barrett, J., dissenting). Note, too, that Judge Barrett's preamble to his possible tests
implicates an already-rejected test-machine implementation. See id. at 1430.
236. /d. Judge Barrett also notes that the technological arts test is a possibility, but rejects it
and discusses it no further. /d. at 1424-26.
237. /d. at 1418, 1430.
238. See supra Part IV.C.3.a.
239. Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1430.
240. /d. at 1431.
241. !d. at 1432.
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Proposals from Commentators

Commentators have also recognized the confusion arising out of case
precedent and Patent Office practice and have struggled with the question of
the appropriate test for eligible subject matter under § 101. However, even
commentators who are sympathetic to software-related inventions have
tended to import proxy-type inquiries into the analyses.
For example, Professor Richard Gruner proposes a set of criteria for
determining eligible subject matter that considers the following features: 1)
an invention fills a user's need with identifiable value, 2) the need is shared
by more than a few potential users, 3) the invention produces regular and
consistent results, and 4) the invention can be described clearly and
succinctly. 242 Unfortunately, each of these criteria represents a proxy-type
inquiry that is unrelated to the real question of§ 101 eligible subject matter.
The first three inquiries-filling a need that is valuable to multiple people
and regular and repeatable-are all more aptly addressed under § 101
utility, not subject-matter eligibility. Similarly, the fourth inquiry, ability to
be described clearly, is without question an inquiry for § 112's written
description requirement. None of these goes to the heart of the question
about subject-matter eligibility.
These proxy-type inquiries are not and should not be part of the subjectmatter eligibility requirement. There is a time and a place for each of these
concerns to be addressed-indeed, the 2005 Guidelines remark that, after
subject-matter eligibility is ascertained, the next steps of examination are to
establish patentability under §§ 112, 102, and 103. By instead addressing
these other, possibly more difficult, issues at the threshold stage, the Patent
Office is openly displaying its opposition towards the patent eligibility of
computer-related inventions. Because members of the Supreme Court have
also indicated their hesitancy to provide patent protection to software and
business method inventions, it is possible the Supreme Court will make
similar mistakes when it addresses the issue. In fact, Justice Breyer's dissent
in LabCorp has overtones of the same proxy-type inquiries. For example,
when Justice Breyer complains that the claim term "assaying a body fluid"
refers to "any test at all," 243 the true underlying concern is that of § 112
enablement, not § 101.

242. See Gruner, supra note 107, at 451-53.
243. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2924 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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V. AN APPROPRIATE PROCESS FOR EXAMINING PATENT APPLICATIONS
CONCERNING COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS

Whether the statutory subject-matter analysis is being performed by the
Patent Office, the Supreme Court, or the Federal Circuit, it is important that
the correct questions are asked and that any proxy-type inquiry be removed
from the determination. This will ensure that § 101 and statutory subject
matter will be given their widest berth, in line with constitutional mandate
and judicial precedent. Most importantly, the question of subject-matter
eligibility must be given only its due weight-either it is patentable subject
matter or it is not. 244 The nature of the invention should not bear on the
analysis, but only the answer. Computer-related inventions should not be
treated differently than any other type of invention; identical treatment will
simplify the process and guarantee that proxy-type inquiries are not
providing an easy way to avoid the issuing of software patents.
The correct process is simple. A Patent Office examiner should first seek
to determine what the applicant has invented and is seeking to patent. Based
on that understanding, the examiner should determine whether the claimed
invention complies with the subject-matter eligibility requirement of§ 101.
In doing so, the examiner should be aware of the breadth of § 101, should
determine whether the invention fits within at least one of the enumerated
categories of § 101 (process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter), and should determine whether the invention fits within one of the
judicial exceptions to § 101 (law ofnature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea). 245 Very few, if any, inventions will not fit within one of the
enumerated statutory categories; most inventions will thus pass this
threshold inquiry and then be subjected to the remaining statutory
requirements for patentability.
However, there will still be a certain number of cases that fall within one
of the judicial exceptions to statutory subject matter. In these, it is not
simply enough to determine whether an invention includes one of these
three judicial exceptions. Rather, if the sole invention is a natural
phenomenon, law of nature, or abstract idea, then it is not eligible for
patenting. To state the idea another way, the relevant question is whether
the claimed invention would preempt all uses of the abstract idea, law of
nature, or natural phenomenon.

244. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("Either the subject matter falls within Section 101 or it does not." (quoting Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Quiss, 932 F.2d 920,929-30 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).
245. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The four categories together
describe the exclusive reach of patentable subject matter.").
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All other inquiries are irrelevant to an analysis of eligible subject matter
under§ 101. If the invention fits within one of the four categories, and does
not fit within any of the three exceptions, it is patent-eligible subject matter.
This is the whole extent of the § 101 subject-matter eligibility question, no
more and no less. Whether the invention is patentable, however, still must
be determined by applying the criteria for utility, novelty, nonobviousness,
and adequate description as provided by§§ 101, 102, 103, and 112. 246 These
inquiries, not the initial threshold stage, present the appropriate time to
make such determinations.
The question of subject-matter eligibility under § 101 for softwarerelated inventions should be no different from the same inquiry for an
invention in another field, say a fuel cell or a chemical compound for
cleaning or a method for manufacturing a stronger synthetic fabric. Each of
these inventions, and countless others, would not raise a hint of a question
with respect to subject-matter eligibility; the same treatment must be given
to software applications. It is incumbent on the courts and the Patent Office
to realize that treating software inventions differently is an artifact of prior
hostility and a means to avoid difficult questions at the examination stageneither of these justifies a heightened inquiry into subject-matter eligibility.
VI. CONCLUSION

When it comes to determinations of subject-matter eligibility for
software-related patent applications, the Patent Office is truly firing an
elephant gun at an ant. In nearly every situation, software-related inventions
should be deemed statutory subject matter under § 101 without additional
thought or inquiry, just like every other type of invention. Software is a
"useful art" under the constitutional mandate and is a "process" under
§ 101. This issue should take up no more of our attention; the eligibility of
software-related inventions should be treated like the ant-sized issue it is.
The Patent Office Guidelines approach this simple issue of subjectmatter eligibility for software-related inventions with a rather unnecessary
elephant gun. The guidelines impose additional inquiries for software
applications that appear to be a remnant of the courts' and Patent Office's
longstanding hostility towards these inventions or a reaction to the public's
disapproval of the Patent Office's recent performance. Moreover, the
guidelines themselves, the tests that have been recently rejected, and other
246. Admittedly, the long history when software-related inventions were considered to be
ineligible subject matter (along with other factors) has resulted in a very small body of prior art
against which to examine these applications. However, this is not a subject properly addressed
via § 101, and its solution is a topic for another day.
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proposals for determining the patent eligibility of software inventions all
include elements that would best be addressed through other patentability
requirements, such as utility, written description, novelty, or obviousnessall of which are not threshold issues and all of which serve other purposes.
If we continue to let the Patent Office reject these applications at early
stages, under the guise of lack of eligible subject matter, patenting in the
software-related inventions will suffer, and progress of the useful arts will
be hampered, not promoted. When the Supreme Court addresses this issue,
and should it follow the same path of analysis, it too will be misguided, and
the result will be harmful to software innovation. To avoid this and continue
the level of vibrant creativity in this field, the Patent Office and the courts
must stop treating these applications differently. There should be no extra
levels of inquiries for these inventions. Rather, the inquiry must be limited
to this: 1) does the invention fit within one of the four enumerated
categories of § 101; 2) does the invention fall under one of three judicial
exceptions; and 3) if the invention does fall under one of the three judicial
exceptions, would the grant of a patent monopoly result in the preemption
of the mathematical algorithm, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. The
Constitution and the Patent Act call for nothing more and nothing less-and
the future of software innovation requires this change.

